

Over the past weekend I have had two pre-occupations – watching the World Cup and reading for today’s Symposium. Fortunately, that hasn’t been as schizophrenic as it might at first sound. Because, of course, the World Cup highlights many of the themes that Harald addresses, and that also recur in the other papers for today. First, of course, is mobility itself, the gathering of people from so many nations in Germany, many of them travelling from a third nation, where they currently live, to revive an affiliation with their nation of nativity. Second, is the spectacle of the crowd itself, cordoned off, segregated and aligned according to national identity, marked by flags that are waved, worn and painted onto bodies. One suspects that some third party foreigners, so to speak, have infiltrated these serried ranks, but only by identifying with, and displaying, the proper attitude, emotions and insignia regarding the adopted nationality. Third, there are the expert commentators, rediscovering or, perhaps re-inventing, tradition as they search back through the archives to portray the essential national-character of each team. As Harald’s paper implies, such football experts may have much in common with a long tradition of social science expertise that viewed migration through the narrow lens of nation-state integrity, security and identity, producing an image of the migrant as a rootless, deviant figure.

Harald tells a far more interesting story. His paper outlines a significant difference in the attitude that States took towards migration, particularly in-migration, in the 17th and 18th centuries, as against a later 19th and 20th century attitude. He reports that in the earlier period States and particularly cities, which typically could not sustain their population numbers by relying solely on the birth-rate, competed to attract migrants for purposes of military and economic strength. What we might term an elective contractualism informed the reception of immigrants – residency within a new State implied voting with one's feet on the part of immigrants, and incorporation within the community on the part of the State. However, this changed in the nineteenth century as “contractualism merged with nationalism”.

We might regard the French Revolution and the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” as a tipping point here. Initially the Revolution welcomed all supporters in a kind of elective contractualism, as I have termed it. Hence figures such as Tom Paine, were extended French citizenship and could participate in the debates of the National Assembly. In 1790 a decree was passed granting French citizenship to foreigners who had resided in France for five years and either held property, or had married a French woman, or had been

accepted by local authorities. Foreign legions were formed to fight for the Revolution. An apparent squaring of the circle had been achieved such that the rights of man and citizen were, or appeared, co-extensive. However this was a passing moment of cosmopolitanism (as Kristeva, amongst others, notes). As the external enemies of the Revolution gathered force and as the economy collapsed, foreigners were regarded with deep suspicion. By 1793 the Committee of Public Safety issued a repressive law against foreigners and advocated their banishment. In the same year Robespierre blamed foreigners for all of the Revolution's set-backs.

Here, I think, we do catch a turning-point where, within the new frame of national sovereignty, "nationals were considered to be members of a geno group", as Harald puts it. Let me speculate that as governmentality installs itself ever more totally, as the cultivation of the population, for both good and ill, becomes the concern of government and its guiding mentalities, as the State's accumulation of statistics turns the nascent democracy into demography, as the welfare state begins to elaborate itself, as social relations and self-reflexivity are more and more mediated by technologies and techniques born of the Enlightenment and the new sciences, as a promise or guarantee of security in the face of disease, disaster and foreign enemies becomes the basis of a new social contract: as these

processes unfold, the bond and mutual recognition between State and citizen (operating as a self-fulfilling mutual mirage) is forged ever more tightly. What of the migrant now?

As borders firm up and the capacities for surveillance increase, the migrant becomes the exception, the deviant, the potential hazard. Not only is this the case in popular imagination, but it is also reflected in academic and administrative analyses of migration flows. Harald highlights that statistical methods, employed to analyse the accumulated national statistics, “reduced migrants to numerical digits” necessarily viewed through the lens of the nation-states’ gaze. Hence, the state-imaginary parallels the national-imaginary, but perhaps within a stricter, less flexible grid. This generates an image of the feckless migrant as “uprooted” and it is this image, and a series connected to it, that informs public policy with regard to migration throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Such a paradigm is profoundly misleading. Instead, migrants are far more aware, alert, informed and selective than these images and policies can allow or recognise. Hence such a paradigm and its allied policies has, by now, a long history of perverse consequences.

There is an interesting parallel here with the way that scientific establishments and their governmental partners

conceive of the lay public when issues such as genetically modified crops or nuclear power or the BSE and like crises enter public debate. As theorists such as Brian Wynne suggest, such august institutions operate with a cognitive-deficit model in which the lay public is regarded as irrational and ignorant, and hence the public's objections, suspicions and knowledge are duly marginalised. Wynne argues, however, rather like Harald, that as soon as you talk with members of the public about their concerns and suspicions you recognise, unless dominated by the cognitive-deficit model, that they often have sound reasons for their concerns and are knowledgeable in ways that, although they don't fit neatly within the abstracted and universalising scientific paradigm, are pertinent, considered and, often, superior or more sound in judgement..

We need, then, a new model of the human subject as migrant and a new method of research and analysis, one that is not dominated by the narcissistic fantasies of the nation-state. As with Wynne's account of the lay public, Harald's account of the migrant recognises significant capacities for agency and knowledgeability. Building on this recognition, Harald also asserts that informed critical migration, as we might term it, will continue irrespective of governmental policies – as legal or illegal. Hence, the liberal paradox: “the interests of migrants acting in pursuit of legitimate livelihood strategies appear to be

irreconcilable with the equally legitimate security interests of residents”. We are back with the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” and the internal incommensurability of the rights of man as against the rights of citizen. Moreover, since September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 the nexus between the State and security has been tightened in the West, as localised instances of political terror have been reframed as the new enemy of international terrorism, a master signifier that threatens to penetrate ever more deeply into the fabric of everyday life, installing its master-code of ethno-nationalism or the national genotype and reconfiguring ideologies, identities and practices in terms of the friend/enemy distinction. I mention July 7, 2005 – the bombings in London on 7/7 as it is now coded– because in that case the great shock was the slowly dawning recognition of so-called home-grown terrorism; in passing let me note, a recognition that successfully repressed the fact that Northern Ireland was and remains part of the UK home territory due to legislative Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament. The difference, of course, was that these new terrorists were British-born Muslims and, most of all, I’m suggesting, fell under the spell of the new master-signifier of international terrorism.

It was this reluctant recognition that the enemy was within – and had been born and grown up as (almost) one of us, that

caused most consternation. A real moral panic ensued, especially amongst the agencies charged with the maintenance of security, because no closing of borders or reduction in rates of immigration could solve this problem – the home-land was haunted by the spectre of its own progeny; the boundary between security and insecurity had collapsed. This is why the events in London were so particularly troubling – because the internal enemy has been invented/discovered as spectre. Already this has released a fury of legislation in both the UK and Australia. Actual, apparent and politically manipulated insecurity have joined to support ideological work and quite severe, perhaps draconian, legislation in order to install the friend/enemy distinction as master signifier and, thereby, to defend society against its internal other; its uncanny, haunting spectre. A self-defeating process, of course, even after one acknowledges that risks of a terrorist kind are on our shared, if incalculable, horizon.

Heightened insecurity, actual or imagined, promotes a mentality that is hostile to migration. Is there an alternative? Harald advocates a change in academic practice, at least, as migrant testimonies are listened to in their particularity and complexity and beyond the logics of state-centric governmentalities. Borrowing from my brief discussion of the distorting and paralysing effects of cognitive-deficit

assumptions, let me suggest that in this move Harald is also gesturing towards a counter-discourse that could compete with the state-centric model not only within, but also beyond the groves of academe, in the bureaucracies and policy-forming institutions and in the public arena. This would involve a new ethic and politics that was informed by doubt and a capacity to tolerate ambivalence, as Beck might say. One that did not rely on splitting, projection and repression, but rather accepted insecurity and disruption as common-place, even universal, and the best basis for mutual recognition, as Kristeva might add – if pushed a bit. It would be good to think that we are taking a tiny step in that direction today, although, of course, we should also doubt ourselves. Perhaps, then, it is the stranger, the migrant, the other who offers a re-newed opportunity to dissolve the liberal paradox for ourselves as/and modernity's children.

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